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ABSTRACT 
Recent research on public transport has seen increasing focus on issues like coordination, 
collaboration and steering in complex governance settings. One of the themes in this field of 
research is related to partnership approaches, as one way of stimulating functioning 
collaboration between formally independent private and public organisations. The aim of this 
paper is to explore the role and function of partnerships as a way of supporting well-
functioning public transport networks and services in fragmented institutional settings. The 
empirical focus is on partnerships between operators and public (transport) authorities in two 
different legal settings: England and Sweden. The analysis is based on interviews with 
operators and public transport authorities in two metropolitan regions in each country where 
innovative partnership working has been developed to deal with various types of barriers to 
delivering better public transport. The results show the key qualities of these partnerships that 
are required for them to function. Although the regulatory contexts are very different, the 
partnership qualities are very similar in both cases. 
1. Introduction 
Well-functioning public transport systems result from network-oriented planning and 
management. The principle of network-oriented public transport is that every route should 
effectively and directly serve a specific flow of passengers, interlinked with the rest of the 
system to provide maximum transfer accessibility (see Mcleod, Scheurer & Curtis 2017 for an 
overview of planning principles). However, an important institutional characteristic of public 
transport is that its control is divided between several organisations. Institutional reforms in 
Western European public transport (van de Velde, 1999, van de Velde & Wallis 2013) have 
made it difficult to establish functioning public transport systems due to organisational 
fragmentation that results in coordination problems, for instance between regional and local 
authorities and operators. In some countries, this has resulted in more fragmented transport 
operations on the ground (O'Sullivan & Patel 2004, van de Velde & Wallis, 2013). In 
consequence, recent research on public transport has seen increasing focus on issues like 
collaboration and steering in complex governance settings (e.g. Sørensen & Longva 2011, 
Hrelja et al. 2016, Hrelja et al 2017).  
One of the themes in this field of research is related to various partnership approaches, as 
one way of facilitating a functioning collaboration between formally independent private and 
public organisations, regardless of the legal setting in which public transport operates (see e.g. 
Stanley & van de Velde 2008, Hensher & Stanley 2010). Examples of issues that are 
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supposed to be managed through partnerships include, for example, service quality and 
reliability, increasing patronage, customer satisfaction and so on. (Davison & Knowles 2006, 
Rye & Wretstrand 2014).  
The aim of this paper is to explore the role of partnerships as a way of supporting well-
functioning public transport, and to analyse the working relationships and working practices 
that these partnerships build upon. The empirical focus is directed towards partnerships 
between operators and public (transport) authorities in two different legal settings: England 
and Sweden. The paper is based on interviews with operators and public transport authorities 
in two metropolitan regions in each country where innovative partnership working has been 
developed to deal with various types of barriers to delivering better public transport. The 
partnerships exhibit characteristics of what in previous research has been described as 
‘relational’ or ‘collaborative’ partnerships in which social learning processes and 
collaborative qualities – such as trust and joint working towards shared goals - are claimed to 
be important aspects when explaining the outcome of the partnerships (see section 2).  
Analytically the paper summarises the current literature on relational contracting and 
collaborative partnership workings, which is then compared to the analysis of real world 
experiences of partnership working in England and Sweden. The paper describes working 
practices in the English and Swedish partnerships and analyses how agreements about 
working practices are made, the role of trust in the partnerships and whether or not the 
partnerships have facilitated joint action compared to the situation that preceded the 
partnership. 
2. Market reforms and new forms of partnership 
In recent decades, public services in countries across Europe have moved away from state 
ownership and management and towards deregulation, privatization, and the introduction of 
competition. This is the case in public transport. Transport authorities usually retain the power 
to define transport services—for example, the definition of the social function of public 
transport—but the introduction of deregulation means public transport system operators are 
entitled to create new transport services independently of public transport authorities. The role 
played by such market regimes is expanding in Europe, for example in Germany, having been 
first introduced in the UK (outside London) in 1986 (van de Velde 2014). A watered-down 
version was introduced in Sweden in 2012, since when regional public transport authorities 
have been entitled to define public service obligations for services in its area, which means 
that it announces which services it intends to put to contract. This new legislation also allows 
operators to initiate new lines on a commercial basis. Public transport has, thus, become a 
service supplied by a market or involving profit-driven organizations. Governance in public 
transport is unavoidably more complex when organizations with differing logics are involved.  
The transition from publicly planned and managed public transport towards more market-
driven public transport systems has generated demands for new forms of control and 
governance. The development of various partnership approaches, as one way of stimulating a 
functioning collaboration between formally independent private and public organisations, can 
be seen as a consequence of the reforms in European public transport. For example, in the UK 
over the past 10 years, it has become typical for local public transport-coordinating bodies, 
bus operators, and local authorities to form what are known as voluntary quality partnerships 
to improve bus services in urban areas. These Bus Quality Partnerships (BQPs) are based on a 
memorandum of understanding and have no legal status. The local authorities can legally 
require bus operators to deliver quality improvements as a condition for the use of 
infrastructure, for example bus lanes; however, in practice very few have done so. Most have, 
instead, brokered voluntary agreements, not seeing the additional benefits of a statutory 
partnership due to the legal complexities. In addition to a growth in passenger numbers, these 
voluntary partnerships have resulted in improved driver training and customer service, bus 
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priority, and newer and cleaner vehicles. However, it is hard to isolate how much of this is 
due to the quality partnership (Rye and Wretstrand 2014. See also section 3 of this paper for a 
discussion on how one measures the effectiveness of a partnership). These partnerships in the 
UK raise analytically interesting questions about how to enable successful partnership 
working between formally independent private and public organisations, and the role different 
forms of control and working relationships may play. For example, what is the role of 
working practices that are explicitly stated and regulated in formal frameworks (such as 
contracts), and what is the role of working relationships that are not explicitly stated but still 
influence collaborations substantially (such as norms, traditions, trust, etc.) in establishing 
functioning partnership working? 
Such questions have already been raised in previous research on contracting in public 
transport which has discussed advantages and disadvantages of various forms of contracting, 
from formalised, tightly specified contracts to more flexible ‘relationship’-based contracts 
between organisations as a way to maximise goal achievement (Hensher 2010, Merkert & 
Hensher 2013, Chung & Hensher 2015, Stanley & van de Velde 2008). The latter research 
calls for ‘trusting partnerships’ (Dementiev 2016, Hensher & Stanley 2010, Stanley 2010, 
Stanley & Hensher 2008, Walters 2010) or more ‘relational contracting forms’ between public 
transport authorities and operators:  
[…] focussing (sic) more on agreement about the contracting process rather than 
attempting to write down complete contracts. In part this reflects recognition that 
overly detailed specification of contractual obligations, with associated KPIs, may 
distract operators from pursuing the high level goals that are the real purpose of 
service provision. It also reflects a recognition that it is not possible to fully specify 
contractual obligations and that, over time, flexibility and a relationship built upon 
trust are more likely to be effective in high level goal achievement […]. In all cases 
of relationship-based contracting, accountability, transparency and incentives to 
performance are critical, to minimise risks of authority capture by the operator. 
(Stanley & van de Velde 2008, p. 22). 
This quote neatly sets out features of relational contracting, including a move away from 
detailed contract specification and a greater focus on high levels goals, the centrality of trust, 
the importance of accountability and transparency. Each of these features is complex and the 
subject of significant research of which work in relation to transport is just one section. In the 
following sub-section, we turn to this wider body of research in order to provide an account of 
relational contracting and its components. This account then informs our empirical analysis of 
practices of public transport partnerships and provision.  
2.1.1 On relational contracting and collaborative partnership working  
In the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries many European countries have seen 
moves from direct government provision of public services towards greater privatization and 
public-private provision in which government secures services from private or non-
governmental organization not only in the public transport area. For its proponents, 
privatization and contracting out public services to private sectors, would bring efficiencies 
from processes in which private organizations compete with each other to provide services, 
and this would enable a move away from the bureaucracy which is assumed to hinder public 
sector efficiency (see Considine & Lewis 2003, Mueller 2003, and for a critique see 
Thompson 2008). Yet there has been increasing concern about the forms of procurement and 
provision associated with this privatisation and contracting, especially in relation to its 
capacity to effectively provide services in the public interest. In response to these concerns 
there has been an increasing focus on developing forms of collaborative and relational 
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contracting and partnership working in public services in general (see for instance, Kelly 
2007, Lenoble & Maesschalck 2010, de Schutter & Lenoble 2010, Vincent Jones 2013).  
The turn to collaboration and relational contracting is based on a critical analysis of how 
changing assumptions about actor behaviour and motivations offers prospects for addressing 
many of the problems associated with privatisation and public private provision. The 
assumptions which have dominated thinking about contracting held that private companies 
will act as ‘rational self-interested’ actors. Therefore it is argued, contracts for services need 
to tightly specify each aspect of provision and distribution of risk, and need to include 
mechanisms such as performance indicators (intended) to enable close assessment of contract 
compliance. This is because contracting parties cannot be expected to do anything beyond 
what is specified in the contract, and because it is assumed that contracting parties will be 
opportunistic given the chance. The high level of specification is required in order to enable 
tights checks on whether each side has done what has been agreed (see for instance Gilson et 
al. 2010, de Schutter & Lenoble 2010). One risk of this approach is the fairly straightforward 
point that avoiding contractual ambiguity is a difficult matter. As many authors have argued, 
it is almost inevitable that a contract will fail to provide adequate specification to cover every 
aspect of service delivery, not least because the few people designing the contract will not 
(cannot) have full knowledge of everything that may happen in relation to the service (see for 
instance Gilson et al. 2010, Lenoble & Maesschalck 2010, Sabel 1994, Van Slyke 2009). 
Moreover, this approach presents a barrier to learning, and importantly also the application of 
learning, in the lifetime of the contract. Simply, if the aim is to anticipate and prescribe a 
response to all eventualities in the construction of the contract, then any learning along the 
way cannot be acted upon (e.g. Sabel 1994, Van Slyke, 2009).  
This apparently obvious point has, according to some, far reaching implications for the 
ways in which public and private or non-governmental organizations should contract and 
form partnerships for service provision. The argument for a different approach can be 
summarized as follows: (a) if, as seems probable, it is not feasible to design a contract which 
fully specifies what should happen in every possible turn of events, and (b) if there remains an 
intention to involve private or non-governmental organizations in delivery of public services, 
then (c) there is a need to reassess the view that actors (in this case private, or non- 
governmental organisations) are expected to act in the ‘rational self- interested way’ 
previously assumed. For advocates of this different, relational, approach to contracting, there 
is no suggestion that companies would cease to act in their own interests, but there is an 
expectation that they consider how their own interests can align with broader (public interest) 
objectives. The idea is that contracting parties agree to a partnership involving high level 
goals, and to a processes of decision making throughout the course of the project which 
involve collaboration and deliberation aimed at working out how to deliver a service which 
meets those goals while providing fair terms for the provider (see e.g. Gilson et al. 2010, 
Lenoble & Maesschalck 2010, Vincent-Jones 2013, Vincent-Jones & Mullen 2010).1 So the 
contracts are less highly specified and more reliant on process. As Van Slyke (2009) explains, 
a move to a more relational and collaborative approach need not mean giving up all elements 
of specification and performance indicators, and contracts may involve a combination of the 
different approaches. The idea is that this allows parties in the partnership to manage and 
consider how to respond to events or factors not fully anticipated at the point the contract was 
                                                          
1 It is worth noting that relational contracting reflects the broader idea of deliberation and deliberative 
democracy. Deliberative democracy in which the aim is to establish processes of deliberative decision-making 
among citizens so that decisions can be justified to everyone affected (see Chambers 2003, Habermas 1998). 
There is also a literature around similar concepts and ideas that are central in deliberative policy analysis and that 
addresses the concept of deliberative policy making, within a framing of deliberative democracy (e.g. Bohman 
1998, Dryzek 2000, Fischer 2003, Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003, Hajer & Versteeg 2005).  
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signed, and that it allows the possibility of applying lessons learned during the contract 
period.   
Clearly this relational contracting places substantial weight on the integrity of the process 
of decision-making, and there are associated risks. In part this is because it is recognised that 
there are risks that one side is persuaded to accept decisions which favour the other and which 
others would hold unfair and perhaps at odds with the goals of the contract (see e.g. Gilson et 
al. 2010, Grafton & Mundy 2017, Stanley & van de Velde 2008). The risk of this becomes 
more acute if there is a power imbalance between the partners (Van Slyke 2009). However 
there is also potential that even with goodwill, between them the partners are unable to arrive 
at decisions which effectively realise the goals. To address these risks, advocates of relational 
contracting emphasise the importance of transparency, including monitoring and 
benchmarking (Gilson et al. 2010, Sabel 1994, Van Slyke 2009). Such measures can provide a 
check that each actor is behaving with good will. Depending on the degree on transparency, 
they also have the potential to enable broader scrutiny of the extent to which the partners are 
making justifiable decisions and avoiding mistakes and weak reasoning (cf. Bohman 1998, 
Habermas 1998).    
These forms of transparency and monitoring may suggest that within relational 
contracting, as within more traditional contracting, there is a lack of trust between partners. If 
so, this would appear to be at odds with the much discussed idea that relational contracting 
relies on trust (see Grafton & Mundy 2017). Arguably, however, the picture is more complex 
and nuanced. First, deliberation and collaboration involve a trust between the actors that they 
will avoid what Habermas would call strategic action (or debate) in which one attempts to win 
an argument by means other than reason, and instead engage in something closer to 
communicative action avoiding bias and seeking justifiable decisions (see Habermas 1998, 
Heath 2006, see also O’Neill 2002).2 Relatedly, monitoring, benchmarking and other forms of 
transparency will always be limited and so as Van Slyke (2009) argues, they will involve 
ambiguity thus requiring a level of trust. Trust in this sense is not taken to be altruism. Nor is 
it something to be simply accepted, but instead is assessed by actors based on evidence and 
experience (see O’Neill 2002). For instance, Van Slyke (2006) also argues that this form of 
trust may result from ongoing relationships between partners, in which each can judge, over 
time, the extent to which trust is warranted. As such, each party can treat their long term 
interest as being trustworthy (see Choudhury, 2008).    
There is a sense in which this form of trust is something primarily assessed by the 
partners. Nevertheless there is work suggesting that its presence or otherwise can be inferred 
by external actors with contract specification increasing in proportion to loss of trust between 
actors, and conversely specification decreasing where trust increases (Brown et al. 2007, see 
also Grafton & Mundy 2017).    
While public transport research has given attention to the potential for relational 
contracting to overcome recognised problems of traditional approaches in the planning and 
management of public transport, there has been relatively little empirical analysis of relational 
partnership working as a way of doing collaboration. Empirically based analyses are 
especially important because of the context dependent character of partnership working. We 
will in the analysis of partnership working between operators and public (transport) 
authorities in England and Sweden investigate which are the important working relationships 
and institutionalised working practices, the role of trust in the partnerships and whether the 
partnerships have facilitated joint working towards shared goals. 
                                                          
2 Further, if one function of transparency is using the minds of external actors to check for ‘mistakes’ in 
decision-making then in this respect it is not a matter of a lack of trust in the good-will of contracting parties.  
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3. Material and methods 
The analysis is based on written sources and interviews. The written sources consist of annual 
reports, strategies and internal work descriptions of working practises in the partnerships. 
Seven officers were interviewed 2016–2017. The officers interviewed held partnership 
manager positions, which were key account manager, principal transport planner, and a 
business manager (bus). Of the interviews conducted in England one interviewee worked at 
an operator, one at a regional public transport authority and one at a metropolitan borough. In 
Sweden we interviewed two officers that worked at two operators and two that worked at a 
regional public transport authority. The interviews (1–1.5h long) were semi structured and 
based on an interview guide. Examples of questions asked were: What was it about the 
previous situation (without the partnership) that was sub-optimal?; What qualities have 
enabled effective working between organisations?; What organisational forms, routines, 
processes and arenas exists to facilitate collaboration between organisations?; Do the 
‘partnership’ and ‘quality’ signal any deeper changes in objectives, roles or ways of working 
between organisations? All interviews were recorded and transcribed.  
The reason to analyse these partnerships are that they are seen by participants to be 
relatively effective examples of partnership working that have supported the development of 
well-functioning public transport. Previous research has tried to measure the effectiveness of 
partnerships in the UK by assessing changes in patronage, profitability, reliability, cuts in 
journey time, improved vehicle quality and customers’ satisfaction (Rye & Wretstrand 2014, 
Preston 2014). The Birmingham Quality Partnerships that form one of the case studies in this 
paper also include KPIs on key factors such as passenger satisfaction, bus delay minutes, on-
bus crime, and vehicle emissions standards. There is also a literature on effectiveness of 
contract based relations between public authorities and bus operators (e.g. Hensher, Ho & 
Knowles 2016), and on how events that were not fully anticipated, such as malfunctioning 
new buses, disturbances caused by passengers, extreme weather conditions and so on can 
influence quality outcomes in procured public transport (Jansson & Pyddoke 2010). This 
research is of special interest for the Swedish case because of the regulatory framework in 
Sweden (see description below). The effectiveness of partnerships based on contractual 
arrangements faced with such events that were not fully anticipated has been measured by the 
number of cancelled departures, punctuality and passenger satisfaction (Jansson & Pyddoke 
2010). However, in this paper we have not analysed the outcomes of the case study 
partnerships in terms of increased ridership, higher customer satisfaction etc. The aim of this 
paper is more about understanding the collaborative ‘qualities’ that can facilitate functioning 
collaborations and, based on this, to provide practice-based suggestions for successful 
partnership working. In addition, these partnerships have been developed in different 
institutional contexts. The basic regulatory framework in Sweden is franchising with gross 
cost contracts while Britain BQPs do not involve any element of procurement or tendering. 
Buses are run by private operators in a deregulated market (see next paragraph for a detailed 
description). However, both partnerships have the aim to bring together regional transport 
organisations, operators and in England cities, to improve bus services to everyone’s mutual 
benefit. The fact that similar partnership approaches have been developed to deal with barriers 
to delivering better public transport in different institutional settings makes a cross-country 
comparison of analytical interest.  
4. Results 
4.1 Background to the cases. The institutional and regulatory landscape for local public 
transport in Sweden and England (outside London) 
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4.1.1 England – organisation of public transport  
As this paper deals with partnership working in the bus sector, the description of the 
organisation of public transport is limited to buses. The basic regulatory framework for local 
buses in Britain outside London was set up under the 1985 Transport Act and has received 
much attention in the literature, so only the briefest summary is provided here.3 The Act 
replaced a regulated subsidised public monopoly situation with one where any profit-making 
operator could register and run a bus service, based on the theory that on-road competition 
amongst many operators would drive down operating costs, improve service quality, cut fares 
and subsidy, and attract new ridership. The public sector would not intervene in the market 
but would just provide “socially necessary” services where these were not provided by the 
market. 
As explained in more detail by van de Velde & Wallis (2013), the first regulatory 
modification to this basic situation was introduced in the Transport Act (2000) (or 2001, in 
Scotland). This legislation allowed local transport authorities (municipalities with transport 
powers) to require operators to provide a minimum level of information about their services; 
to provide a multi-operator integrated ticketing scheme, although not one that provided fares 
lower than single operator tickets; and/or to enter into a binding Statutory Quality Partnership 
(SQP) scheme with the local authority to improve the quality of bus services in in a 
designated area. Quality could cover aspects such as vehicle specifications, infrastructure, 
cleaning, information, driver training, parking enforcement en route and at stops and so on 
but, crucially, not service levels/frequencies or fares – these latter remained wholly controlled 
by operators. Finally the Act provided powers for local authorities to apply to national 
government to move from the deregulated situation to one with franchising of local bus 
services, more on the Swedish model – so-called Quality Contracts.  These powers were 
modified, making them a little more straightforward to use, in the 2008 Local Transport Act. 
With the exception of the power on information, all these powers have been very little 
used and indeed no quality contract has ever been introduced. From the late 1990s onwards, 
however, there was a rapid growth in the number of local voluntary quality partnerships 
between local authorities and bus operators aimed at achieving much the same as an SQP, but 
without the attendant legal risks and costs. In the English context it is partnerships of this 
nature that are the main focus of this paper. 
4.1.2 Sweden – organisation of public transport  
The Swedish organisation of public transport entails municipal authorities and county 
councils in each county sharing the financial and political responsibility for public transport. 
New public transport legislation was introduced in 2012 (SFS, 2010). It has been described as 
a ‘hybrid deregulated regime’ (van de Velde 2014). The aim of the legislation is to prevent 
public transport being viewed as an end in itself, and instead as a means to achieve policy 
objectives and to be coordinated with other policy areas. The legislation requires regions to 
establish a Regional Public Transport Authority (RPTA), which is responsible for the strategic 
planning of public transport – manifested in a Regional Transport Supply Programme (RTSP) 
that covers both commercial services and services to be contracted. Based on the RTSP, the 
RPTA is entitled to define Public Service Obligations (PSO) for services in its area, which 
means that it declares which services it intends to submit to contract. The tendered contracts 
are financed by regional income tax and from fares. In the Swedish context, it is partnerships 
between RPTAs and contracted operators that are the focus of this paper. In addition to the 
tendered contracts, the legislation allows operators to initiate new lines on a commercial basis. 
The RPTAs must be notified about such services with a 14-day period for entry and exit 
                                                          
3 The interested reader is referred to Preston (2008) for a much fuller analysis of the process, and its effects. 
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registration. Information about the service has to be integrated into the common passenger 
information system (SFS 2010:1065). 
The reforms in England (outside London) and Sweden thus reflect the institutional reform 
changes in Europe towards deregulation, privatization, and the introduction of competition – 
and in both countries there have been attempts to deal with potentially sub-optimal outcomes 
of these institutional structures by means of partnerships between operators and public 
transport authorities. We will in this paper analyse two partnerships between operators and 
public authorities, a BQP in Birmingham in England, and a partnership in the Västra Götaland 
region in Sweden called the ‘Västtrafik model’.  
4.2 Partnership working in Birmingham  
Birmingham is the largest city in the West Midlands, an urban region in west central England, 
approximately 200km northwest of London. The population of Birmingham is 1.1 million, 
with a further 1.8 million in the surrounding urban region. Administratively the urban region 
is composed of 7 directly elected local authorities with powers over the local roads 
infrastructure and spatial planning; and a regional public transport coordination body called 
Transport for the West Midlands (TfWM) which is governed by a board of councillors (local 
politicians) from the 7 local authorities. Finance for local transport comes primarily from 
central government to these local and regional bodies; local tax raising and borrowing powers 
are very limited. 
Bus services are owned, organised and operated in the deregulated regime outlined in 
Section 4.1.1, and the dominant operator with over 80% of the market is a company called 
National Express West Midlands (NExWM), a subsidiary of the global bus and coach 
operating group National Express, which is itself headquartered in Birmingham.  
Partnership working in Birmingham has taken place mainly between TfWM and 
NExWM, with some limited input from the local authorities, the main exception being 
Solihull, to the southeast of Birmingham itself, but also involving other smaller operators. The 
partnership developed out of a dissatisfaction on the part of the local authorities and TfWM 
with what the bus network was delivering previously; and from a gradual realisation on the 
part of the bus operators that if they were to grow their overall market, there was a need to 
work with the public authorities. This was explained very clearly by one of the interviewees: 
What was suboptimal in the old arrangement where we didn't have partnerships. By 
definition we didn't have that collaboration. National Express West Midlands would 
purely make decisions down to commercial imperatives which suited their balance 
sheet and failed to take on board any of our objectives or outcomes that we were 
seeking as a result of public transport or specific development in Solihull which we 
wanted to try and focus around public transport. In essence we didn't have any 
communication with them at all; we would just get notified periodically of bus 
service changes that would be done as a commercial decision to them, and we 
would never ever have had any input into that. National Express West Midlands 
have had a very risk averse culture; as a result it was very, very difficult to get them 
to do anything that slightly increased any financial risk to them (Local authority 
representative). 
The partnership developed in stages and has been defined in published partnership documents, 
some of which have been quite detailed, although interviewees traced the increase in 
partnership working back before the release of the first document in 2010, to around 2008 
when the Local Transport Act 2008 made partnership working both more possible (because 
prior to that some forms of partnership working could have been defined as illegal anti-
competitive collusion between private companies) and, from the point of view of operators, 
more necessary if they were to avoid the threat to their profitability and market share of a 
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move to a franchised system. Another reason was changes in personnel. Thinking about how 
the partnership began, the TfWM employee interviewed stated:  
Prior to 2008 relations were quite fractious between the Public transport authority 
and the main operator. I think partly that was due to historic reasons. I think when 
deregulation occurred in 1986, very much partnership was not encouraged, in fact 
quite the opposite. A lot of personalities from that time were still around into the 
90s, into 2000s but I think as time moves on personalities change realising it's 
better to work together (TfWM representative). 
The first partnership document was a 74 page document, Transforming Bus Travel (TBT), 
published in 2010 (Centro, 2010). This was produced by TfWM (at that time called Centro) 
with the input of all the main bus operators in the region. It “sets out how, with partners, we 
can improve the quality of bus travel in the West Midlands through a passenger focused 
transformation” (p.3). The document also noted that: 
Delivering an agenda for change requires leadership… Delivering a world-class bus 
network will involve ambition, a can-do attitude from people at all levels, and a 
shared purpose of achieving the desired future (p. 64).  
This shared purpose was mentioned by several interviewees, such as the local authority 
representative, who said: 
There's much more impetus for them [the operators] to start delivering to more 
wider shared outcomes rather than we're a commercial entity, we're only going to 
take decisions based on that. Well it's not for any commercial benefit to them, some 
of the decisions that they've had to take. I think it has actually just been in the spirit 
of partnership and collaboration, and I think there has just been a change of culture 
within some personnel (Local authority representative).   
TBT set out an agenda for changes to bus services in the region, without being too detailed 
about exactly what had to happen where. It was more of a call for action than a precise action 
plan. It is important to note that it makes clear that the legislative framework, which changed 
somewhat under the 2008 Transport Act, provides the legal tools to TfWM to improve the 
network through franchising if a partnership approach fails to deliver. This made it clear to 
the operators that they, as well as the public authorities, were expected to “up their game” and 
work together or otherwise face a move to a different regulatory framework.  That the 
operators saw the necessity of responding positively to this possibility was confirmed by the 
interview with NExWM: 
It basically wipes out a third of National Express' global profits, franchising. Then 
the focus became how do we mitigate that political risk. TBT2 started that, that's 
what changed with the Alliance [a more developed partnership described below], 
that's why the Alliance moved it up a gear, that's why it was five years, that's why it 
contained much bigger, bolder promises because we saw the risk as being more 
significant (NExWM representative).    
TBT was coincident with a series of 11 “Network Reviews” where the bus services in specific 
local areas were considered in detail, public consultation and participation were carried out, 
and TfWM, operators and local authorities as a result committed (in local voluntary quality 
partnership agreements) to a number of quality improvements. These typically included new 
and cleaner vehicles, sometimes revised route networks where buses were concentrated on 
key corridors to provide high frequency services, real time passenger information, smartcard 
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ticketing, more security staff, and secure and comfortable bus stations and stops. Some 12 
operators were involved in one or more of these quality partnership agreements. 
In 2013–2014 TBT was superseded by a further partnership document (one for each main 
operator) called Transforming Bus Travel – Partnership Plus. Compared to TBT, the 
document was shorter, contained many more specific commitments from operators and 
TfWM (for example, the implementation of bus priority on specific corridors, or the purchase 
of a specific number of new vehicles), and is much more clearly a joint document than was 
TBT. For example, there are several actions in the later document that commit TfWM and 
NExWM to joint funding of staff or initiatives. The later document also commits NExWM to 
limit fare increases to inflation plus 1 percentage point; it is extremely unusual for a bus 
operator to make publicly this kind of commitment that obviously has a direct impact on its 
profitability. 
Finally in 2016 TBT was itself superseded by a partnership arrangement called Bus 
Alliance. Whilst supported by documentation (TfWM 2017) the Alliance is more an approach 
to partnership working, overseen by a high level joint board of operators, TfWM and local 
authority representatives and local politicians. It has a set of objectives and targets related to 
ridership, extent of the network, quality of service, ticketing, security and so on, but it does 
not spell out actions in detail, expecting these instead to be developed continually by the 
operational staff of the various parties, working together and overseen by the Alliance Board. 
It was clear however from the interviews that the partnership documents are only one 
aspect of the partnership. They serve as a reference point, and also the differences between the 
documents give an indication of the way in which the partnership has developed over time, 
but the partnership really is principally seen as a way of working together to improve bus 
services. This also depend on day-to-day dialogue and face to face meetings between officers. 
I think it's got stronger through the years as well such that now - some of their staff 
have passes for our building, they'll hot desk if they're in our office. Likewise, 
we've got passes for their building. This would have been unthinkable three or four 
years ago (TfWM representative). 
A NExWM representative in a similar way emphasized the need for regular meetings that 
create an understanding of the partner's internal organisational conditions. 
You've got to bring them with you. Let's have - you must have your weekly, or 
fortnightly, or monthly meetings with your opposite number [at TfWM] you must 
go through it, you must work out how do we evolve it. Recognise they've got 
political constraints, they probably know it's rubbish in some ways but they've got a 
councillor who's insisted they have this particular thing on a poster or whatever. 
Let's get 90 per cent there even though we can't get 100 per cent (NExWM 
representative). 
The interviewees from the operator, TfWM and the local authority all had a tendency to 
compare the situation with some form of partnership (essentially, since 2008) to that when 
there was no partnership, rather than comparing what was achieved under each of the different 
partnership arrangements over time. The main advantages from the point of view of the public 
sector partners were that the bus operators were now, as a result of the partnerships, more 
responsive to requests from the public sector for additional service, or not to make cuts to 
services, or improved vehicles and so on.  The key advantage cited by NExWM was to 
improve its image and thus head off the threat of franchising, but also that the commitments in 
the partnership meant that the public sector was more likely to deliver on bus priority, 
improved stop and bus station infrastructure, and improved marketing, than they would have 
without the partnership, and thus contribute to increased revenue or reduced operating costs 
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for the operator. This is not to say by any means, however, that the partnership always 
delivers what each side wants, or that there are not disagreements. For example, the public 
sector partners have a desire to upgrade the bus fleet to improve emissions much more quickly 
than NExWM believes is possible – as the interviewee from the latter said: 
The advantage of the way our relationship works, is that we can go to [their main 
contact at TfWM] and go look [name of contact], you've just - I was just walking 
down the road talking to one of my chaps who says Centro [TfWM] have written in 
something in Solihull that says every bus has to be Euro 6 by 2020. I got an action 
from that conversation to go to [them] and go look [name of contact], if that's what 
you want to do we can do it but it's bonkers [crazy] because we've got a load of 
Euro 5 buses that are two years old that won't be able to service Solihull so we may 
actually end up running less service - it's a perverse incentive. But we can have that 
conversation or we can go look [name] how can we adapt, how can we - what's the 
wriggle room? (NExWM representative). 
The local authority interviewee also highlighted that there are still differences and 
disagreements in the relationship, that it is not all “plain sailing”, but that there is 
much more common ground than there was before 2008: 
Well I think in the previous era it would be conversations with National Express 
where we said well we want this. No. We want this. No. We want this. No. We 
want this. No. Whereas now they're saying yes sort of three times out of five.  So, 
when they do say no those two times, you can actually accept that they're probably 
doing that for a particular reason and they can't accommodate it. So, it's about 
having that balance isn't it and understanding that there's got to be - you've got to be 
a bit reasonable about it (Local authority representative).   
Essentially, the partnership as it has now developed was viewed by the local authority 
and TfWM representative as a way of allowing them to communicate their objectives 
to the bus operator and then negotiate with the operator to deliver these. There was a 
recognition on both sides that the partnership can never mean that everything that each 
side wants will be delivered; but there was equally a feeling expressed very clearly 
that the partnership produces a relationship that makes it more likely that some of the 
things that each partner wants to be delivered are now more likely to be delivered at 
least some the time. In addition, the operator representative saw it as a commercially 
appropriate response to the threat of franchising – which would reduce his company’s 
profitability – and a means of delivering better services and thus increasing the 
demand for buses in the region. 
4.3 Partnership working in Västra Götaland 
Västra Götaland, in western Sweden, covers 49 municipalities and one county council 
(Region Västra Götaland, RVG), and is Sweden’s second largest region in terms of 
population, with the region’s economic and population centre located in Gothenburg. Since 
January 2012, RVG has been the Regional Public Transport Authority. RVG is the highest 
level of elected political organisation in the region and has the regional target of doubling the 
public transport share of total passenger transport by 2025. RVG owns the company 
Västtrafik that plans and procures public transport.  
The so-called ‘Västtrafik model’ has been developed by Västtrafik to handle perceived 
sub-optimalities with previous contractual arrangements with operators: 
In the past the procurer’s [Västtrafik’s] primary objective was to procure and 
manage contracts. There was no evaluation of quality. Low prices were the primary 
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objective and in the wake of them came effects such as lack of punctuality, litter 
and poor order on board, bad vehicles and neglected maintenance (Västtrafik 2014, 
p.11). 
The partnership is described by interviewees both as a cultural shift from a more ‘production 
orientated’ to a more ‘customer or service’ orientated form of planning and management, and 
as a shift from a purely ‘supplier role’ for operators to a partnership between operators and 
Västtrafik. These shifts have been achieved through more flexible contracts (compared to the 
contractual arrangements in the past) so that changes to deal with changing conditions for 
public transport may now be decided to a greater extent than before in dialogue during the 
contract period, rather than only through changes to the formal contract. The ambition, 
according to Västtrafick, is to see public transport more as a joint venture between the 
authority and operators. 
We work with goal-steering, we work together, we create common values and 
goals. Therefore we know approximately how to get there, which activities to work 
with. We do it together and it has been received positively by the operators. We 
want to get away from [the view] that Västtrafik is the client and they [the 
operators] are service providers, i.e. a we and them thinking (Västtrafik 
representative). 
The Västtrafik model is thus for Västtrafik a joint effort in innovative procurement that aims 
to create a common vision for how and what should be provided by the operators and 
Västtrafik to travellers. However, the basic driving forces has not changed for the partners. 
Operators enter into the partnership because they have made market-based decisions fixed in 
contracts to achieve profits. All partners must agree on the working practices, including 
Västtrafik, emphasized an operator. Then the parties must also deliver what has been agreed 
upon: 
For us, as an operator, it is important that Västtrafik adheres to the intentions of the 
formal legal contract between us, because we have made a business decision based 
on the basis used in the procurement. We cannot change things without making 
market-based decisions for our company's best (operator representative). 
These motives have not changed for Västtrafik either, and the operators are still a 
counterparty negotiating with. Even though the partnership has meant that public transport is 
seen more as a joint venture then before this has not necessarily resulted in partners being 
‘kinder’ to each other, as an interviewee from Västtrafik put it:  
We are more honest with each other and we have gained greater confidence in each 
other. That does not mean that we have become kinder to each other when we 
negotiate. Then we have different roles and responsibilities, and we are very aware 
of that (Västtrafik representative). 
However, due to growing trust, there is now, according to the same interviewee, more of an 
ambition to negotiate win-win solutions than there was before. Previously, he perceived that 
the operators suspected that Västtrafik tried to cheat them in negotiations, and vice versa that 
Västtrafik sometimes felt that operators who had difficulty in meeting their own financial 
forecasts sought to find reasons for renegotiation of contracts in a self-interested way. 
Västtrafik is admittedly open to renegotiating contracts when the conditions are changing for 
operators, but with the ambition that renegotiations will result in achievement of the goals that 
both parties have agreed upon. These goals include increased numbers of passengers, 
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increased customer satisfaction, stable finances and higher profitability for operators and 
improved collaboration.  
There are several working relationships that are important for the function of the 
partnership and for developing trust between partners. Västtrafik sets the goals and the overall 
framework for transport services. The partnership is based on travel incentive contracts with 
some fixed reimbursement as well as some variable reimbursement related to how many 
travellers use public transport. There is a bonus for customer satisfaction (based on the results 
of customer satisfaction surveys) and penalties if requirements in the contract are not reached. 
Variable reimbursement and bonuses represent approximately a third of operators’ 
reimbursement. There is also joint business plan and business management between 
Västtrafik and the operators. All of these are important formal aspects of the partnership that 
govern how the organisations can act jointly. 
One of the pillars of the Västtrafik model is to know who is doing what and that we 
have decided how we will work in a similar way. The overall purpose of the 
Västtrafik model is to get a better collaboration where we will increase travel and 
get more satisfied travellers. But then you must know how to work. Therefore, the 
processes are important, and it has taken many years to develop them. We started 
4–5 years ago (operator representative).  
The partnerships are based on several formally decided working practices by which joint 
action is produced, of which so called ‘process maps’ are one example. These maps, for 
example, describe how services (routes, times etc) can be changed. They include a timeline 
for the process and a description of the responsibility of organisations during each step in the 
process that leads to a decision. There are also other important routines and working practices 
that give an understanding of the other’s perspective, and through which trust is produced.  
We have had workshops where we have agreed on the common core values [that 
shall guide the work], for example trust. We will have a workshop today about core 
values where we will evaluate our joint work. We have made a so-called 
‘temperature measurement’ and have put a ‘temperature’ on how much trust we 
have for each other. We do a new follow-up on this today. Have we improved 
collaboration? Or have we gone the other way? We do evaluations at regular 
intervals. Then we change the methods used to measure this (operator 
representative) 
Joint rules and structures that govern the behaviour of organisations have produced a 
partnership in which the interviewed operators say they now have more flexibility and 
freedom of manoeuvre.  
We don’t feel monitored by Västtrafik. We are working together, and we 
collaborate on most issues. We check a lot with Västtrafik. Västtrafik is not 
primarily trying to give us penalties and we solve problems more in agreement. We 
have worked according Västtrafik model in a few years, and it enables us to get to 
know each other much better. We meet very often and it brings us close to each 
other. We communicate much better than without this kind of model. The 
communication between us is very important (operator representative).   
The feeling this interviewee had of not being monitored can be interpreted as an effect of the 
existence of a sufficiently high level of trust between organisations. Indeed, Västtrafik wants 
to procure function and not ‘micromanaged operators’ as one interviewee from Västtrafik put 
it. The Västtrafik model has meant that operators increasingly decide how operations should 
be run, for example, timetables and marketing, which further illustrates the important role 
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trust between organisations play in the partnership. But, it is a trusting relationship with 
responsibility:  
Västtrafik have confidence in us, but we need to we live up to their expectations. If 
we do not, they will withdraw the freedom we have. I think that Västtrafik will take 
back the freedom they have given us if we deliver public transport with low 
punctuality or if the vehicles are not traffic-safe. [...] Västtrafik has some control 
over us partners and give us freedom of action if we deliver what have been agreed 
(operator representative). 
Should the operators fail to fulfill the requirements in the contract Västtrafik could request 
them to pay penalties, as already mentioned. 
That operators increasingly decide how operations should be run has another 
consequence. The Västtrafik model has resulted in a transfer of skills from Västtrafik to 
operators, for example in marketing and quality improvement. The partnership therefore 
requires operators to develop new competences compared to the situation before the 
partnership. It requires better leadership skills in all organisations, and it is no longer possible, 
as one interviewee from an operator said, ‘just to know how to drive buses’ when the goal is 
to deliver high quality public transport services. The model thus results in higher demands on 
operators, which, according to one interviewee from a large operator, makes it difficult for 
smaller operators to successfully compete for contracts. This may be expected to contribute to 
this company's commitment in having a good relationship with Västtrafik.   
5. Discussion 
There is a commonality in the origins of the partnerships in both Birmingham and Västra 
Götaland in that both stem from a perception that the current system is insufficiently focused 
on what the end customer (the passenger) needs, particularly in terms of a high quality 
integrated product, and that partnership working is necessary to deliver this. In Västra 
Götaland, the operators were perceived to be focused narrowly on delivering the requirements 
of the contract; and in Birmingham, on cutting costs and maximizing revenue to maximise 
short term profitability. Linked to the above is a shift in the culture within public transport 
from a more production orientated to more customer/service orientated one. This is a general 
trend that is working through public transport but it is also likely to result from changes in 
personnel, as older staff with a more ‘production orientated’ perspective retire from the 
industry. In this, both partnerships reflected the ideas of relational contracting as focusing on 
agreed high level goals and an ongoing decision-making process for deciding actions to 
realise those goals, rather than attempting high levels of contract specification.    
The interviews illustrate that operators and public authorities are looking for mutual 
benefits from partnership working, and that each side gets something that they would not 
have, had they not collaborated. However, this does not mean that they have exactly the same 
objectives. Instead organisations explore mutual goals and reap the benefits of working 
together, and in some ways, as already mentioned, the partnerships can be a way of avoiding a 
less optimal situation for one or both of the parties. It is also the case that whilst partnerships 
may have formal outcomes, each party also has its own objectives for being part of the 
partnership, and sometimes they will still do things that are sub-optimal from the point of 
view of other partners. Clearly, too, an impetus for partnership working in both the Swedish 
and English examples is some form of ‘threat’ behind the partnership, which imposes a risk 
on the private operator to which they must respond. In England, this is the threat of 
franchising: continued pursuit of short term commercial objectives without paying any heed 
to the objectives of other stakeholders increases the risk that a new regulatory framework will 
be introduced that will have a much greater impact on profitability. In Sweden, the threat or 
risk is that of losing a contract at the next bidding round; being able to show positive 
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experiences in working closely with the franchising authority is likely to improve chances of 
winning the contract once again. As our discussion in Section 2 indicates, a finding that 
partners act on self-interest would not be unexpected by advocates of relational contracting 
and collaboration. While actors are expected to be trusting in seeking to realise mutual goals, 
they are also understood to have interests in the partnership albeit that they may need to take a 
longer term view rather than pursuing short term interests. As described previously, actors in 
the case studies did align their interests to the partnership goals. Moreover, actors indicated 
that they recognised that some short term interests might need to be set aside in pursuit of 
these goals. The Local Authority respondent reported that having formed the partnership, the 
operators had been willing to take decisions which would not maximise their immediate 
commercial interests. In these ways, the actors behaved as might be expected for a 
collaborative partnership. However the motivation to adopt a more relational or collaborative 
approach based on a ‘threat’ of the imposition of franchising (i.e. a different regulatory 
system) does add a further element and raises an interesting point about the influence that 
regulatory powers given to public authorities might have on moves to more relational 
contracting.  
The partnerships also signal a shift in organisational roles and ways of working together. 
This is a further important sense in which the partners working practices by which 
collaborative behaviour, involving trust and understanding of the motivations and roles of 
other organisations get produced. There was clear evidence from both interviews and 
document review that partnerships develop over time and if the first steps are successful then 
they become deeper and more effective as people gain better knowledge of each other and of 
their organisations. Again this reflects wider literature on relational contracting and 
collaboration which indicates the role that experiences gained from ongoing relationships in 
judging trustworthiness of partners. 
Of course, an acceptance of the other organisation’s ways of working is necessary and 
becomes greater as people work together for longer. It was clear from the discussions in 
Birmingham that personalities played a role in the success of the partnership. Interviewees 
pointed to changes in key staff, and also how they found that their counterparts in the other 
organisations were people that they could work with. Thus, the partnership is partly dependent 
on personalities, but it is also a reason for staff in different organisations to get to know one 
another much more than they would have in the pre-partnership situation, and if they then find 
that they can work together, this further improves the partnership.  
As has been highlighted earlier, in the English example the documents are important as a 
way of formalizing and recording the shared objectives of the partnership, but they have 
played different roles as the partnership has developed: from ‘call to action’ at the start, to 
‘action plan’ later, and now ‘documentation of a shared commitment and process’ in the latest 
version. Interviewees did not say that these documents were unimportant, but they saw other 
aspects of the partnership as more key to its success. The partnership in Västra Götaland 
clearly shows the importance of continuous dialogue and face to face meeting, for example 
illustrated by the so called ‘temperature measurements’ of collaboration and trust where 
partners discussed such qualities of partnership working at workshops.  
The partnerships should in summary be viewed as gradual trust-building processes that 
develop over time and become deeper and more effective as people gain better knowledge of 
each other. The partnerships do contain commitments from both parties to deliver actual 
improvements to public transport services: in the case of Birmingham, for example, there are 
as described in Section 3 KPIs covering bus delays and passenger satisfaction, but there are 
also commitments to deliver bus priority measures, new vehicles, new ticketing options and 
joint marketing, amongst many others.  The partnership is therefore judged to be successful in 
part on how well the KPIs are achieved and how many of the commitments are delivered.  
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This may illustrate that a move to more collaborative approaches is a matter of degree rather 
than a binary all or nothing (see Van Slyke 2009). However, the success of the partnership is 
also judged rather qualitatively in terms of how well the people in the different organisations 
related to and ultimately trust one another.   
Thus, the results show that functioning public transport partnerships require qualities 
such as trust, understanding of the other organisation’s interests, understanding of the other 
organisation’s role, understanding of how the other organisation works and the conditions and 
constraints under which that other organisation operates (reflecting previous public transport 
research, e.g. Hrelja et al. 2016). This also indicates that there are challenges to developing 
functioning partnerships and that in some conditions therefore they will not develop as fully 
as in the cases examined here. Partnerships are situated in and shaped by the local or regional 
contexts in which they are developed.  
6. Conclusions 
Even though there are different formal legal settings in European public transport they seem 
to be producing similar problems and concerns and dissatisfactions that must be dealt with in 
some way (e.g. managing congestion and using bus priority and better street management to 
do so, improving service quality and reliability, increasing patronage, improving customer 
satisfaction, improving environmental performance, linking public transport and new land use 
and so on). We have in this paper analysed the dynamics of such a situation that is created by 
the formal legal settings that frame the action space of public and private organisations who 
are trying to improve public transport in England and Sweden, and what they can do to get 
around these problems by means of partnership working.  
Despite the very different legal contexts for public transport in England and Sweden there 
were similarities in the function of the partnerships analysed. Both were attempts to bring 
together regional transport organisations, operators and cities to improve bus services to 
everyone’s mutual benefit. There first tended to be individual short term profit-motivated 
action by organisations who were quite distant/separate from one another, but then this shifted 
to a longer term deliberative based collaboration in partnership form. The regulatory and 
formal institutional framework did not change, but the partnerships built an ‘informal space’ 
to bridge the gaps in the regulatory context. Here the English formal legal setting is some way 
from the Swedish legal setting, particularly in the relative power of the involved operators and 
public authorities, but dialogue between organisations made joint working possible in both the 
English and Swedish partnerships. This brought together public authorities, operators and 
roads authorities to improve the public transport offer to passengers. The partnerships also 
brought with them a gradual culture shift from a more production orientated perspective to 
one that were service- and customer-orientated. 
This cultural shift, and the function of the partnerships, depended on trust between 
participating organisations being developed by working relations and collaborative practices. 
In light of the discussion on relational contracts and collaboration in previous research, 
effective partnership working can be understood as a form of learning activity in which 
neither side is expected to know in advance exactly what outcome they intend. The ideal is 
that each side learns from each other through open dialogue, and in this way the collaboration 
is assumed to arrive at better decisions that would otherwise be possible. Further, and 
significantly given the problems faced in other types of contracting, this approach is held to 
have potential to accommodate unexpected events or conditions – such as future events and 
unforeseen circumstances. It does this because it provides a basis for the actors to deliberate 
and decide how such events should be tackled when they arise or become understood. As such 
it may avoid the need to attempt to draw up fully specified contracts if both sides in a 
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partnership are willing to support interest of the other side (for either franchising, or 
formalised partnership). This requires a high level of trust between partners.  
However, this does not mean that organisations give up their own interests. We should 
also be critical and not just be cheerleaders for partnership working. There are risks from a 
public interest perspective if partnerships become ‘too cosy’ (this reflects risks identified in 
wider research e.g. Gilson et al. 2010, Grafton & Mundy 2017, Stanley & van de Velde 
2008). In an English legal setting this could result in local English public authorities 
becoming less inclined, for example, to move to franchising of local bus services in cases 
when franchising would be beneficial to passengers. Nonetheless a key finding from this 
research which is relevant to the English context is that swift results should not be expected 
from partnerships but if they are viewed as a long term relationship-building exercise between 
the various parties involved, then they can deliver results in terms of improved passenger 
satisfaction flowing from improved infrastructure, service and vehicles delivered because of 
the partnership.  
In a Swedish legal setting this could result in difficulties for operators that not already are 
part of partnerships to successfully compete for contracts. A practical implication of the 
results is that Swedish authorities should be made aware of the power dynamics between 
operators and authorities resulting from the kind of partnerships studied here. Partnerships, 
that becomes too closed, may even restrict quality in procured public transport if they give 
operators a too big bargaining space, for example in situations where operators can claim that 
events are beyond their control (such as road congestion, malfunctioning new buses etc.).  
Finally, we have not analysed the outcome of the partnerships in terms of increased 
ridership, higher customer satisfaction etc. The outcomes of the partnership in Sweden are not 
evaluated directly by the participating organisations themselves. Instead it is assumed that the 
positive development of patronage and customer satisfaction indirectly show the effectiveness 
of the partnership. In England, positive developments in passenger satisfaction, plus actual 
improvements in the quality of the bus fleet, bus priority measures, stops and so on are seen as 
the outcomes that indicate the success of the partnership. An analysis of the outcomes is for 
this reason desirable and should provide the basis for improvements of partnership working 
practices, but it would require a study on its own.  
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